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Abstract
Background: Plasmodium falciparum malaria remains a major public health problem. A vital component of malaria
control rests on the availability of good quality artemisinin-derivative based combination therapy (ACT) at the
correct dose. However, there are increasing reports of poor quality anti-malarials in Africa.
Methods: Seven collections of artemisinin derivative monotherapies, ACT and halofantrine anti-malarials of
suspicious quality were collected in 2002/10 in eleven African countries and in Asia en route to Africa. Packaging,
chemical composition (high performance liquid chromatography, direct ionization mass spectrometry, X-ray
diffractometry, stable isotope analysis) and botanical investigations were performed.
Results: Counterfeit artesunate containing chloroquine, counterfeit dihydroartemisinin (DHA) containing
paracetamol (acetaminophen), counterfeit DHA-piperaquine containing sildenafil, counterfeit artemether-
lumefantrine containing pyrimethamine, counterfeit halofantrine containing artemisinin, and substandard/
counterfeit or degraded artesunate and artesunate+amodiaquine in eight countries are described. Pollen analysis
was consistent with manufacture of counterfeits in eastern Asia. These data do not allow estimation of the
frequency of poor quality anti-malarials in Africa.
Conclusions: Criminals are producing diverse harmful anti-malarial counterfeits with important public health
consequences. The presence of artesunate monotherapy, substandard and/or degraded and counterfeit medicines
containing sub-therapeutic amounts of unexpected anti-malarials will engender drug resistance. With the
threatening spread of artemisinin resistance to Africa, much greater investment is required to ensure the quality of
ACTs and removal of artemisinin monotherapies. The International Health Regulations may need to be invoked to
counter these serious public health problems.
Background
Plasmodium falciparum malaria remains a major public
health problem in much of the world, despite decades of
interventions [1]. The tragedy remains that many more
malaria patients would survive if they had timely access
to good quality, affordable and efficacious medicines.
With the implementation of pivotal artemisinin-based
combination therapy (ACT) throughout malarious
Africa and attempts to make it accessible and affordable,
hope of controlling malaria has been rekindled [2,3]. Of
42 African countries with P. falciparum malaria, ACT is
now national policy in 40 (95%)[4].
A diverse range of important problems reduce ACT
effectiveness, including inaccessibility, poor prescribing,
poor adherence and poor medicine quality. There are
two main categories of poor quality medicine. Counter-
feit (or falsified, spurious) medicines (i.e. ‘deliberately
and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity
and/or source;[5,6]) and substandard medicines (i.e.
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ized....which do not meet quality specifications set for
them by national standards’;[6-8]). Substandard medi-
cines frequently, and counterfeits occasionally, contain
sub-therapeutic amounts of active pharmaceutical ingre-
dients (API) and/or may show suboptimal release of API
(dissolution), exposing parasites to sub-lethal concentra-
tions of API(s) [8-10]. However, the percentage API in
genuine medicines may also be reduced after manufac-
ture if they are degraded by extremes of temperature
and humidity [11].
Substandard and counterfeit anti-malarials were major
problems in pre-ACT Africa. Those medicines with sub-
therapeutic amounts of API are likely to have contribu-
ted to the spread of resistance to previous generations
of anti-malarials, such as sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine
(SP) and chloroquine [10,12,13](Additional file 1). With
evidence that SP and chloroquine-resistant P. falci-
parum entered Africa from SE Asia [14,15], the recent
descriptions of artesunate resistance there [16] suggests
that, in addition to major local repercussions, it is very
likely to spread to Africa.
There are increasing reports of poor quality artemisi-
nin monotherapies in Africa (Figures 1, 2, Additional
file 1). However, monotherapies, even when of good
quality, should be replaced by ACTs [1]. Although poor
quality ACT has yet to be reported in Asia, there has
been an alarming increase in reports of poor quality
ACTs in Africa [6,17-23](Additional file 1, Figure 2).
Poor ACT quality, along with poor prescribing and poor
adherence, would provide a fertile environment for the
spread of artemisinin-resistant parasites. This would
destroy the renewed hope for malaria control in Africa
and killing many patients who would otherwise survive.
Therefore, the authors offered to analyse anti-malarial
medicines of suspicious quality in sub-Saharan Africa
via meetings, INTERPOL and the Counterfeit Drug For-
ensic Investigation Network (CODFIN [24]).
Methods
Analyses of packaging, chemistry and botany were
performed blindly. The results have been reported
using the MEDQUARG guidelines where possible
[25]. Samples were stored at +4°C for between 1
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standard and degraded were defined based on the
above definitions, with packaging analysis, in compari-
son to authentic samples, as the crucial evidence for
the distinction between counterfeit and substandard/
degraded. This was performed without any intellectual
property considerations. When data did not allow
such classification but the sample contained API%
outside reference ranges, such medicines are referred
to as ‘poor quality’.
Physical appearance
The physical appearance and text on packaging were
examined and compared with known genuine samples
when available [26]. Nineteen companies were asked for
genuine samples of their products and 6 (32%)
responded. DigitalColorMeter (v3.4.1, Apple Inc.) was
used to measure the percentage of red (R), green (G)
and blue (B) pixels at predefined points on the
packaging.
Chemical investigations
Sample API was quantified using a modified high per-
formance liquid chromatography (HPLC) method with
photo diode array detection[ 2 7 ] .S a m p l e sw e r ea l s o
screened by two direct ionization mass spectrometry
(MS) methods: Direct Analysis in Real Time (DART)
and Desorption Electrospray Ionization (DESI) in both
conventional and reactive modes [28,29]. Select samples
were also analysed by X-ray diffractometry (XRD; X’Pert
Pro, Philips, Almelo) and isotope ratio MS to determine
the mineral composition [26]. GlaxoSmithKline plc
(GSK) performed analysis of ‘halofantrine’ samples using
Fourier Transform Infra Red spectroscopy (FTIR), veri-
fied when necessary by HPLC with electrospray ioniza-
tion and mass spectrometry detection (Eckers & Wolffe
pers. comm.)(Additional file 2).
A sample was defined as one dosage unit-such as a
blister or blisters in one packet (if present) or one bot-
tle. The %API range, relative to the stated dosage,
allowed on HPLC analysis was 90-110%. An important
issue, barely addressed, is that in work such as this, the
available sample size of dosage units (such as one blis-
ter) is considerably less than that required in testing
described in pharmacopoeias [e.g. [30]]. Testing for uni-
formity commonly requires that if one tablet in a sample
contains < 75% or > 125% of API relative to the stated
dosage, the sample fails the assay [30]. Tablets within
this range may represent a Type II error of accepting a
sample when it is poor quality. Ignoring the variability
in chemical assays, assuming that tablet API% in an
“acceptable” population is normally distributed with
standard deviation of < 5% (to ensure that all tablets are
within 75-125% range) there are, at most, chances of
1.3/1,000, 2.3/1,000 and 0.5/1,000 of finding a tablet
with 75%-85%, 75%-90% and 75%-90% API, respectively.
Therefore, for tablets with API > 75%, taking a prag-
matic approach that a sample fails if more than 1 dosage
unit falls outside the 90-110% range, carries a relatively
small chance of rejecting a compliant sample or Type I
error.
Biological investigations
Tablet samples were analysed for pollen/spores [26],
which could be indicative of either the place of manu-
facture, the source of the individual ingredients or both,
and be influenced by wind dispersal, seasonality and
transplantation beyond their known natural range.
Results
Seven sets of anti-malarials, of ten different types, were
collected in eleven African countries 2002-2010 (Table
1, Additional file 2). The results were reported to the
appropriate national Medicines Regulatory Agency
(MRA) and the company as stated on the packaging.
Artesunate monotherapy
Six blisters of ‘Mekophar’ artesunate tablets were col-
lected in 2007 in Bamenda, Cameroon. All contained
chloroquine but no artesunate was detected by HPLC or
MS. XRD and botanical analysis suggested that CAM
S5/07 had a different source from the other counterfeits.
Bulrush (Typha angustifolia)p o l l e nw a sf o u n di nt h i s
specimen only, suggesting use of contaminated water or
a source near swampland in East Asia or Africa.
T h ec o u n t e r f e i t sw e r ep r i n t e dw i t haN i g e r i a n
National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and
Control (NAFDAC) registration number and a state-
ment that they were marketed by ‘Neros Pharmaceuti-
cals Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria’, which is the distributor of the
genuine product. In comparison to genuine equivalents
(Mek 10/03,10/05), the packaging colours and holo-
grams differed and the counterfeit packets were heavier.
The genuine hologram was introduced in response to
counterfeits but the counterfeit hologram is not similar
to those used by Mekophar (Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, Addi-
tional file 3).
In addition, six and one samples of artesunate mono-
therapy were collected by AET and SB, respectively, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2007/8.
O n es a m p l e( D R C0 8 / 0 1 )i sp o o rq u a l i t yw i t ht w o
tablets, stated to contain 100 mg artesunate/tablet, con-
taining 79 and 88 mg artesunate as determined by
HPLC. These tablets were analysed 19 months after the
expiry date, which could account for the low %API.
Since the packaging contained no manufacturer details,
it was not possible to compare with genuine examples
but casts doubt on its authenticity. DRC 07/01 (Figure
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in Paris. No evidence was found that this company
exists in France. Analysis of this sample showed that it
contained 70.9-88.5 mg artesunate/tablet.
In ad hoc sampling in West Africa in 2008 (by JT &
PF) of 13 artesunate monotherapies, one (Gh 08/15) had
2/4 tablets outside reference API% range. The authors
were unable to obtain genuine samples of this product
and it may be substandard, degraded or counterfeit. An
additional six (46%) samples had one tablet with artesu-
nate content < 90%, relative to the stated dose.
Dihydroartemisinin (DHA) monotherapy
Two samples labelled as dihydroartemisinin tablets
(Cotecxin™) were collected in Kenya in 2007 [23,31].
HPLC analysis gave a DHA content of Kenya 07/01 of
101%, relative to the stated dose whilst no DHA was
detected in Kenya 07/02. Only three pollen grains were
identified in Kenya 07/01, including Hibiscus species,
which are cultivated over many tropical and temperate
areas. Kenya 07/02 contained abundant brown fungal
spores but only eight pollen grains including Chenopo-
diaceae pollen, consistent with a source in SE China or
in adjacent areas of SE/south Asia but not with Africa.
The packaging of Kenya 07/01 and 07/02 were extre-
mely similar. The same differences in tablet size and
blister colour as previously described were noted [23].
The counterfeit tablet diameter and blister foil are larger
and markedly lighter orange, respectively, than genuine
samples (Figures 8 &9, Additional file 4).
Of the three DHA samples collected during ad hoc
sampling in West Africa, although relatively few tablets
could be analysed, all had one tablet outside reference %
API range. No differences were detected in the packa-
ging of Gh 08/07 in comparison to samples from the
authentic manufacturer. A sample of DHA collected in
Nigeria was counterfeit [32] and was found to contain
paracetamol (acetaminophen) by MS.
Halofantrine monotherapy
Eighteen samples of Halfan™ (halofantrine) tablets, pro-
vided by GSK, included two genuine samples and 16
counterfeit examples collected in Sierra Leone (2),
Nigeria (9), Cameroon (1), DRC (1), Tanzania (1),
Liberia (1) and China (1) in 2002/2007. Of the counter-
feit samples, four (25%) contained artemisinin, seven
(44%) contained acetaminophen, one (6%) contained
dipyrone, one (6%) contained pyrimethamine, one (6%)
contained halofantrine and no API was detected in two
(13%). Those containing artemisinin were found in
Sierra Leone and Nigeria whilst those containing aceta-
minophen were found in Nigeria, Cameroon, Liberia
and China. The median (range) content/tablet of artemi-
sinin was 38 (21-70) mg and 156 (< 1-317) mg for
Figure 2 Frequency of reports of poor quality anti-malarials in Africa per year 1988-2010, for all anti-malarials (black), non-artemisinin
derivatives (blue) and artemisinin derivative montherapies and ACTs (red). Each poor quality medicine type (by API or brand name per
country per report) included. Reports of more than one poor quality medicine of the same brand name/API/formulation per paper classed as
one report. The fall in frequency in 2010 is probably an artifact of investigations-up to October 2011 there have already been 64 reports of poor
quality anti-malarial types in Africa. See Additional file 1.
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Medicine
Country
Classification Stated Manufacturer Chemistry/Pollen Packaging/Notes
’Artesunate’ 50 mg
tablets
Cameroon
Counterfeit ’Mekophar Chemical
Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock
Company’
Marketed by: ‘Neros
Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Lagos
Nigeria’
Contains chloroquine. No artesunate
detected. Pollen grains of bulrush
(Typha angustifolia). Pollen and
chemistry suggests two different
types
Collected because of suspicion of
their low cost (1500 FCFA ~$3/pack
of 12 tablets). Packet and leaflet
colours and holograms differed and
the counterfeit packets were
heavier.
’Artesunate’ 100 mg
tablets
DR Congo
Poor quality ’Marinate’. No manufacturers
details on the packaging. Only
‘GUJ/DRUGS/1407’
79 and 88% artesunate/tablet, but
analysed 19 months after expiry
Probably labeled as made in
Gujerat, India. Genuine packaging
not available
’Artesunate’ 100 mg
tablets
DR Congo
Counterfeit Astrinate on one face of leaflet
and Arinate on reverse
Stated to be ‘Manufactured for
AT17 RUE POISSONNIERS 75018
PARIS’
88.5, 70.9 mg artesunate/tablet No agent/company in Rue
Poissonniers. ‘Arinate’ is the trade
name of artesunate monotherapy
from Dafra Pharma, Belgium.
’Artesunate’ 50 mg
tablets
Ghana
Poor quality ’LEVER Artesunate’
Stated to be manufactured by
’ADAMS PHARAMCEUTICAL
(ANHUI) CO., LTD. ANHUI, CHINA
Division of Sunflower Int’l Group’
artesunate 39.0, 43.0, 47.0, 47.0 mg/
tablet
Unable to obtain sample of genuine
packaging
’Dihydroartemisinin’
60 mg tablets
Kenya
Counterfeit ’Jiaxing Nanhu Pharmaceutical Co.
Ltd. Jiaxing City, under license of
Beijing Holley-Cotec
Pharmaceuticals (PR China)’ with
stated trade name ‘Cotecxin’
No dihydroartemisinin detected.
Chenopodiaceae pollen consistent
with a source in SE China or in
adjacent areas of SE and south Asia
but not with Africa
The counterfeit tablet diameter and
blister foil are larger and markedly
lighter orange, respectively
’Halofantrine’
250 mg tablets
Sierra Leone,
Nigeria, Cameroon,
DRC, Tanzania,
Liberia, China
Counterfeit ’SmithKline Beecham Laboratoires
Pharmacetiques’
One contained correct %
halofantrine-fraudulent extension of
expiry date. Artemisinin,
acetaminophen, dipyrone,
pyrimethamine wrong APIs.
Fagopyrum (buckwheat) and
Sesamum (sesame) pollen in
counterfeits. Consistent (but does
not prove) with seasonally arid
source in southern China. Betula
(birch) pollen grain and a
Stenochlaena fern spore in other
counterfeits suggesting E/SE Asia,
inconsistent with India/Africa
12 counterfeit Halfan tablets were
classified as Types A, B, C, D, & E.
Type A contained artemisinin while
B, C, D & E contained
acetaminophen or no API detected
Halofantrine
Syrup 30 ml bottle
DR Congo
Counterfeit ’SmithKline Beecham Laboratoire
Pharmaceutiques Esplanade
Charles de Gaulle 92731
NANTERRE Cedex,’
No API detected Came with a spoon, leaflet and
packet, suggesting considerable
investment in deception.
’Dihydroartemisinin-
piperaquine’
40/320 mg tablets
China
Counterfeit ’Zheijiang Holley Nanhu
Pharmaceutical Group Ltd Under
license of HolleyPharm’ with
stated trade name ‘Duo-Cotecxin’
Sildenafil (Viagra; median (range)
10.4 (6.1-18.4) mg/tablet) detected
in the matrix of the counterfeit
tablets. Cibotium fern, widespread in
SE and south Asia in both
counterfeits and comparator
genuine samples, suggesting that
both manufactured in same region
Packaging with language errors
with English and French (Franglais)
’Artemether-
lumefantrine’
20/120 mg tablets
Ghana
Counterfeit ’Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd,
Beijing, China’
No artemether or lumefantrine
detected. Contain pyrimethamine
(6.2-25 mg/tablet) and unidentified
yellow pigment in counterfeits.
Pollen in counterfeit samples
consistent with manufacture in E/SE
Asia but not in Africa or India
8 tablets/blister for counterfeits
rather than 6 for genuine. Errors in
German language spelling
’Artemether-
lumefantrine’
20/120 mg tablets
Cameroon
Counterfeit ’Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd,
Beijing, China’
No artemether or lumefantrine
detected. Contained pyrimethamine
and sulphadiazine
6 tablets/blister for counterfeits
Artesunate &
amodiaquine co-
blistered. 100/300
mg tablet
Ghana
Poor quality ’Pharmanova Limited, Accra,
Ghana. Manufactured by: Atlantic
Pharmaceuticals Limited Accra,
Ghana’
Artesunate 92.0, 103 mg/tablet and
amodiaquine 237, 240 mg/tablet
Unable to obtain sample of genuine
packaging
See Additional File 2 for details.
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diverse excipients with one sample containing only
starch and organic compounds (as in genuine ‘Halfan’)
and three containing a variety of combinations of talc,
starch and calcite. The sample with only starch and
organic compounds detected, contained no detectable
pollen and was originally genuine, containing 250 mg
halofantrine/tablet, but had manufacturer and expiry
 
Figure 3 Genuine artesunate ‘Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company’ packet (Mek 10/03).
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packaging and XRD were able to correctly identify this
form of counterfeiting by expiry date tampering. Fago-
pyrum (buckwheat) and Sesamum (sesame) pollen grains
were found in one counterfeit halofantrine sample.
Sesame grows in arid areas in India, SE Asia, China and
northern Australia, whilst Fagopyrum grows in North
America and China. The absence of wind blown grass
Figure 4 Counterfeit artesunate packet labelled as made by ‘Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company’ (Cam S5/07).
Counterfeit hologram in red circle.
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source in southern China. Another sample contained a
Betula (birch) pollen grain and a Stenochlaena fern
spore, suggesting East/SE Asia as a source, inconsistent
with origins in India or Africa. The packaging of 12
counterfeit Halfan tablets were classified by GSK into
Types A, B, C, D, & E. Type A contained artemisinin
w h i l eB ,C ,D&Ec o n t a i n e da c e t a m i n o p h e no rn oA P I
(Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13).
A sample of counterfeit halofantrine syrup, collected
( b yS B )i nK i v u ,D R C ,i n2 0 0 6h a dn oA P Id e t e c t e d .
Nor did it contain sulphamethazine as previously
reported from another counterfeit halofantrine syrup
[33]. This came with a spoon, leaflet and packet, sug-
gesting considerable investment in deception.
Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine ACT
Eight blisters of co-formulated dihydroartemisinin-piper-
aquine (Duo-Cotecxin) due to be shipped to Africa from
China were provided by Holley-Cotec Pharmaceuticals,
China in 2007. DHA and piperaquine were detected in
the four genuine samples but not in the four counterfeit
samples. Sildenafil (Viagra; median (range) 10.4 (6.1-
18.4) mg/tablet) was detected in the matrix of the coun-
terfeit tablets, not in the coating. Botanical analysis of
both genuine and counterfeit samples revealed spores of
the fern Cibotium, widespread in SE and south Asia,
suggesting that both genuine and counterfeit manufac-
turers were in the same region.
The packaging of four counterfeits contained language
errors with English and French combined (’Franglais’)e .
g. ‘Composition par tablet’ and ‘Dihydroartemisinine’
within the English text (Figures 14 &15, Additional file
5). In comparison to the genuine samples, the text was
less clearly printed and lacked a hologram. The %B col-
our of the blue areas on the packet differed slightly
from equivalent areas on the genuine packets (P = 0.02).
Both genuine and fake contained blue-coated white
tablets and the external tablet colours were similar in
terms of RBG%. The fake tablets were significantly
Figure 5 Genuine artesunate with ‘Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company’ and ‘Neros’ packet hologram (Mek 10/
03).
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genuine tablets (P = 0.02).
Artemether-lumefantrine ACT
The Food and Drug Board, Government of Ghana pro-
vided in 2009, via INTERPOL, two packets of ‘Coartem’
stated to be co-formulated artemether-lumefantrine
(eight tablets/blister) and stated to be manufactured by
‘Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd’. Samples of genuine private
sector Coartem with eight tablets/blister were not avail-
able and therefore a sample bought in Kenya was used as
a comparator (Ken 06/01). Both Ghanaian samples con-
tained no detectable artemether or lumefantrine but did
contain pyrimethamine (6.2-25 mg/tablet). All tablets
analysed were yellow, which in the case of genuine Coar-
tem results from the presence of lumefantrine. An inso-
luble (in weak acid) yellow pigment was detected in both
counterfeit samples but no amodiaquine, another yellow
anti-malarial, was detected by HPLC or MS. The yellow
pigment was adsorbed on a nylon filter membrane and
eluted with alkaline methanol and had maximum absor-
bance at 425 nm but could not be identified by MS. The
genuine Coartem samples contained Dacrydium pierrei
pollen, a tree growing in southernmost China and in the
mountains of northern SE Asia. Pollen in the counterfeit
samples were consistent with manufacture in E/SE Asia
but not in Africa or India.
The packaging suggested that Gh 09/01 was counter-
feit (Figures 16, 17 and 18, Additional file 6). The coun-
terfeiters confused ‘m’ with ‘rn’ in ‘lagern’ (German for
storing) and printed the packets with the word ‘lagem’
in error. Initially Gh 09/02 was thought to be genuine,
but 8 tablets/blister and smudged codes on the blister
implied that it was also counterfeit (Figure 18, Addi-
tional file 6), supported by the absence of APIs. The
batch numbers of counterfeit ‘Coartem’ as released by
the Food and Drug Board (FDB), Government of Ghana,
were X0089 and M1200 [18,19], the same as reported
here. Interestingly, it was reported that ‘t h ef a k eC o A r -
tem contains three strips, each with eight tablets and
sold at GH 6.00 while the original one contains four
strips with six tablets and sold at Gh 9.00’[18]. That
eight tablets were present in each counterfeit Ghanaian
blister is further evidence that they were counterfeit, as
Figure 6 Counterfeit hologram on packet labelled as made by ‘Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company’ (Cam S5/07).
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samples were labelled as manufactured in 2008 and
2009.
Suspect Coartem from Cameroon were provided via
Novartis and INTERPOL in 2010. These consisted of
blisters of six tablets, labelled as made in 2008, contain-
ing no artemether-lumefantrine, but containing pyri-
methamine and sulphadiazine. This suggests that the
criminals producing them differed from the counterfei-
ters operating in Ghana or that they changed their
packaging in response to changes made by Novartis.
Artesunate+amodiaquine ACT
Of one co-blistered artesunate+amodiaquine collected in
Ghana, 1/2 pairs of tablets (only 3 pairs per blister) ana-
lysed contained less than the reference range for artesu-
nate and amodiaquine and may be counterfeit,
substandard or degraded.
Discussion
This wide diversity of different counterfeit and substan-
dard anti-malarials from eight sub-Saharan African
countries are cause of great concern. However, this
study has important limitations, especially since it
involved ad hoc collection and estimates of the fre-
quency of poor quality anti-malarials cannot be deduced
from these data. Tablet dissolution was not measured.
The sampling method will bias towards finding counter-
feit, rather than substandard, anti-malarials. It provides
early warning, worrying for public health, as would a
case series of new rapidly fatal epidemic influenza
strains. However, that counterfeit formulations of ACT
have been found at all is extremely alarming and will
increase treatment failure, death and morbidity, yield
covert unprotected monotherapy, increase the frequency
of anti-malarial drug resistance and produce unexpected
and clinically confusing adverse events. That 32% of
Figure 7 Counterfeit artesunate packet labelled as made by ‘AT17’. (DRC 07/01).
Newton et al. Malaria Journal 2011, 10:352
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Page 10 of 22artesunate and all DHA and DHA-piperaquine in the
West Africa and DRC collections had one analysed
tablet outside %API reference range is difficult to inter-
pret. Analysis with larger numbers of tablets/sample is
needed to understand the clinical implications.
There has been a dramatic rise in reports of poor
quality non-artemisinin and artemisinin containing anti-
malarials in Africa, suggesting an important worsening
situation and/or an emerging interest (Figure 2)[34-36].
There are no data available that allow accurate estima-
tion of the prevalence of poor quality anti-malarials in
Africa, but enough information is available to know that
it is a serious problem. Public health bodies should not
wait for large-scale evidence based on random surveys
Figure 8 Genuine dihydroartemisinin (DHA) made by ‘Jiaxing Nanhu Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.’ packet (Ken 07/01).
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Page 11 of 22to decide on interventions, as these data will take years
to acquire. Unless action is taken quickly, poor ACT
quality and profligate use of monotherapy (whether gen-
uine or poor quality) will contribute to the failure of
ACT. Although, the correlation between artemisinin
resistance and poor drug quality has not been proven,
modeling strongly suggests that underdosing is an
important factor in the spread of P. falciparum drug
resistance [13]. Poor quality anti-malarials, usually sub-
standards, resulting in blood concentrations between
those that kill resistant and sensitive parasites and those
that kill only sensitive parasites will select for drug resis-
tance. Counterfeits may also aid and abet this process by
increasing the risk of hyperparasitaemia and
Figure 9 Counterfeit DHA packet labelled as made by ‘Jiaxing Nanhu Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.’ (Ken 07/02). Different shades of green, e.
g. in red circle, from Ken 07/01.
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Page 12 of 22Figure 10 Genuine halofantrine Halfan GlaxoSmithKline hologram.
Figure 11 Counterfeit ‘Halfan ‘hologram labelled as made by ‘GSK’ (4040 & 4023). GSK = GlaxoSmithKline.
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Page 13 of 22Figure 12 Counterfeit ‘Halfan’ hologram labelled as made by ‘SB’ (4024). SB = SmithKline Beecham.
Figure 13 Counterfeit ‘Halfan’ hologram labeled as made by ‘GSK’ (5070, 5312). GSK = GlaxoSmithKline.
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Page 14 of 22recrudescence and the co-circulation of substandard and
counterfeit medicines may be especially prone to engen-
der drug resistance especially where patients ‘shop’
around when treatments fail.
The initial misclassification of a counterfeit arte-
mether-lumefantrine as genuine emphasizes the
importance of analysing both packaging and the phar-
maceutical chemical composition and the importance of
access to samples of the authenticated packaging, which
was found to be difficult with only 32% companies
responding. In addition, we may have classified counter-
feit samples, containing correct %API, as genuine
Figure 14 Genuine ‘Duo-Cotecxin’ dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine packet made by ‘Zheijiang Holley Nanhu Pharmaceutical Group Ltd
Under license of Holleypharm’ (China 07/14). Genuine hologram in red circle.
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Page 15 of 22because we were unable to compare all samples with
genuine packaging.
The discovery of unexpected APIs in counterfeit anti-
malarials have important public health implications [37].
Unexpected pyrimethamine, especially if taken repeat-
edly, could give rise to clinically-confusing adverse
effects, such as bone marrow suppression, rash and
insomnia [38]. Depending on the background level of P.
falciparum antifolate resistance [39,40], they may-at
least initially-alleviate some malaria symptoms but are
extremely unlikely to be curative. Pyrimethamine, in
combination with sulphadoxine, is still used in sub-
Saharan Africa, especially for Intermittent Preventive
Treatment in pregnancy (IPTp) [4]. The presence of
Figure 15 Counterfeit dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine labeled as ‘Duo-Cotecxin’ made by ‘Jiaxing Nanhu Pharmaceutical Group Ltd
Under license of Holleypharm’ (China 07/18). ‘Franglais’ in red circle.
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Page 16 of 22pyrimethamine as hidden monotherapy in counterfeits
will engender the further spread of P. falciparum dihy-
drofolate reductase mutations in Africa, increasing ther-
apeutic failure and reducing the useful life of SP for
IPTp. Covert consumption of anti-malarials will also
confuse our understanding of changes through time of
the frequency of clinical failure and molecular markers
of chloroquine and SP resistance [39-41]. The median
concentration of sildenafil, a wrong API in DHA-pipera-
quine, was 10.4 mg/tablet, whilst the smallest dose/
tablet of Viagra is 25 mg, suggesting that covert admin-
istration may cause unexpected penile erection and, as it
is not usually taken by the acutely ill, unknown compli-
cations. The consequences could be severe especially as
this drug is contraindicated in those with hypotension
and myocardial ischaemia. In addition, patients may be
exposed to dangerous drug interactions between covert
consumption and other medicines patients may take,
such as sildenafil with anti-HIV medication and chloro-
quine and pyrimethamine with anti-epileptics [38].
Pollen analyses of the counterfeit anti-malarials were
consistent with an origin in eastern Asia, but do not
prove this. In 2001 Guangzhou police arrested Nigerian
and Chinese men for production of counterfeit halofan-
trine [42]. No evidence was found, from pollen analysis,
of counterfeit pharmaceutical production in Africa.
However, production facilities for counterfeit anti-malar-
ial packaging have been seized in Nigeria [43].
What should be done [6,8,10,12,44]? Multiple parallel
strategies are urgently needed to improve the quality of
medicines people take and to ensure that they are avail-
able and taken at the recommended doses. The enor-
mous investment in the development, evaluation and
deployment of anti-malarials is wasted if the medicines
that patients actually take are, due to criminality or
carelessness, sub-therapeutic. Objective data on the epi-
demiology of poor quality anti-malarials are needed to
allow quantification and mapping of the problem [40],
the relative public health importance of counterfeit and
substandard ‘products’, determine intervention
Figure 16 Genuine artemether-lumefantrine ‘Coartem’ made by ‘Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd, Beijing, China for Novartis Pharma AG,
Basle, Switzerland’ (Ken 06/01).
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Page 17 of 22prioritization and, through following changes through
time, evaluate their effectiveness. Second, WHO esti-
mated that 30% of countries have either ‘no drug regula-
tion or a capacity that hardly functions’ [45,46] and
presumably many of these are economically-poor and
malarious. MRAs are keystones for crucial interventions
to improve medicine quality and without them most
interventions are doomed. There are only three coun-
tries with WHO pre-qualified Quality Control medicine
analysis laboratories in the whole of malarious Africa
[47]. Investment in African MRAs and quality-assured
medicine quality laboratories would facilitate countries
ability to regulate medicines. There is a danger of poor
quality medicines use in clinical trials, likely to bias
results and therefore mandatory testing of such medi-
cines should be carried out, preferably at one of the
WHO-prequalified laboratories. Third, increasing the
reach of affordable good quality ACT will reduce mor-
tality [2,3] and undercut the counterfeiters, by reducing
their profit margins. Stockouts of ACT may encourage
poor quality anti-malarial distribution. Fourth, artemisi-
nin monotherapies are still very widely available in large
quantities [37,48], despite appeals to restrict their use,
and their removal where patients have access to ACT is
a key intervention. Fifth, much more attention needs to
be paid to substandard medicines, with inspection and
facilitation of good quality production. Sixth, increased
cooperation between MRAs, police, customs, malaria
control programmes, pharmaceutical companies and
international organizations is vital in countering the
trade in counterfeit medicines. Seventh, new portable
and rapid techniques, based on Raman and Near-
Figure 17 Counterfeit ‘Coartem’ labelled as made by ‘Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd, Beijing, China for Novartis Pharma AG, Basle,
Switzerland’ (Gh 09/01). Differences from genuine sample (Figure 16) in red circles.
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medicine quality and assisted in recent seizure of imported
counterfeit ACT in Nigeria [21]. Although which techni-
que is the most accurate and appropriate remains unclear,
they could potentially empower drug inspectors in the
screening of pharmacy stock for poor quality medicines.
Eighth, we are woefully ignorant as to how best to tackle
poor medicine quality in different situations and there has
been a damaging lack of public health, civil society and
political will to tackle the problem, which those combating
the fake Chinchona bark and quinine scandals in the 17
th-
19
th centuries would have found puzzling [10]. Impor-
tantly, African heads of state and President Chirac issued
the Cotonou Appeal for more action against counterfeit
medicines in Africa [49].
With artemisinin resistance in Asia, authorities there
have a duty to contain resistant parasites so that they do
not spread to Africa. African countries may wish to lobby
for more political will in Asia for containment and for
financial and human capacity support of African MRAs.
The International Health Regulations (IHR)[50] may be a
method of facilitating change. In the IHR “disease”
means an “illness or medical condition, irrespective of
origin or source, that presents or could present signifi-
cant harm to humans”. Poor quality medicines and inap-
propriate monotherapies-being man-made public health
hazards-fall within this definition and the IHR could be
invoked to try to stop the spread of poor quality medi-
cines. In addition, a treaty, drafted under the auspices of
the WHO, to bring international agreement on interven-
tions to reduce the frequency of both substandard and
counterfeit medicines would allow coordinated action
[51]. Action is needed immediately or the hopes of con-
trolling malaria in Africa may, again, be dashed.
Conclusions
The description of a wide diversity of different counter-
feit and substandard anti-malarials from eight sub-
Figure 18 Counterfeit ‘Coartem’ labelled as made by ‘Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd, Beijing, China for Novartis Pharma AG, Basle,
Switzerland’ (Gh 09/02). Differences from genuine sample (Figure 16) in red circles.
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Page 19 of 22Saharan African countries are cause of great concern.
Criminals are producing diverse harmful anti-malarial
counterfeits with important public health consequences.
The presence of artesunate monotherapy, substandard
and/or degraded and counterfeit medicines containing
sub-therapeutic amounts of unexpected anti-malarials
will engender drug resistance. With the threatening
spread of artemisinin resistance to Africa, much greater
investment is required to ensure the quality of ACT and
removal of artemisinin monotherapies. Support for
MRAs is likely to be a key intervention. The Interna-
tional Health Regulations may need to be invoked to
counter these poor quality medicines.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Reports of anti-malarial medicine quality in Africa.
Updated from Newton et al (2006a) and Amin & Kokwaro (2007). Data
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R = random sample, CR = case report, S = seizure, WHO = World Health
Organization, USP = United States Pharmacopeia. Additional reports
kindly provided by Roger Bate.
Additional file 2: Summary of packaging, chemical and botanical
analysis of anti-malarial samples. Results for tablets with AI chemical
content < 90% or > 110% relative to the stated dose in red.
Additional file 3: Features of counterfeit artesunate labelled as
made by Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company.
Distinguishing features in red font.
Additional file 4: Distinguishing features of counterfeit DHA
labelled as made by Jiaxing Nanhu Pharmaceutical Co.
Distinguishing features in red font.
Additional file 5: Distinguishing features of counterfeit DHA-
piperaquine labelled as made by Zheijiang Holley Nanhu
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Distinguishing features in red font.*
medians, + medians (range).
Additional file 6: Distinguishing features of counterfeit artemether-
lumefantrine labelled as manufactured by Beijing Novartis Pharma
Ltd, Beijing, China for Novartis Pharma AG, Basle, Switzerland.
Distinguishing features in red font.
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